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Key Recovery Against 3DES in CPU Smart Card Based on Improved
Correlation Power Analysis
Yanting Ren, Liji Wu , Hexin Li, Xiangyu Li, Xiangmin Zhang, An Wang, and Hongyi Chen
Abstract: The security of CPU smart cards, which are widely used throughout China, is currently being threatened
by side-channel analysis. Typical countermeasures to side-channel analysis involve adding noise and filtering the
power consumption signal. In this paper, we integrate appropriate preprocessing methods with an improved attack
strategy to generate a key recovery solution to the shortcomings of these countermeasures. Our proposed attack
strategy improves the attack result by combining information leaked from two adjacent clock cycles. Using our
laboratory-based power analysis system, we verified the proposed key recovery solution by performing a successful
correlation power analysis on a Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) hardware module in a real-life 32-bit CPU
smart card. All 112 key bits of the 3DES were recovered with about 80 000 power traces.
Key words: Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES); CPU smart cards; power analysis; key recovery; side-channel
analysis
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Introduction

Smart cards are among the most widely used tamperresistant hardware options and can provide a variety
of security mechanisms because of their embedded
CPUs. The CPU processing power makes it possible
to implement cryptographic algorithms in the card.
However, the security of smart cards is threatened by
Side-Channel Analysis (SCA).
SCA is a passive and non-invasive attack that exploits
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side-channel information (e.g., power consumption,
electro-magnetic radiation) leaked by a cryptographic
device to recover secret data (e.g., the key). Compared
with invasive and semi-invasive attacks, SCA is
more efficient and powerful, and is less dependent
on the attackers’ equipment and knowledge of the
target devices. Since Kocher et al.[1] first introduced
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) in 1999, SCA has
received much attention. Theoretical and experimental
research results have shown that mathematical security
is not sufficient to ensure the security of real-world
cryptographic devices. Unfortunately, the designers of
cryptographic devices often underestimate the risks
of SCA. For economic and technical reasons, simple
countermeasures such as adding noise and filtering the
power consumption are currently the most common
approaches taken[2] . In recent years, many commercial
cryptographic devices have been reported as being
vulnerable to SCA[3–5] .
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is a symmetric
cryptographic algorithm proposed in 1970s. Today, its
key length (56 bits) is too short to meet security
requirements. Therefore, the 3DES, which has a longer
key length (112 bits or 168 bits), has taken the place
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of DES and become one of the most widely used block
ciphers in smart cards.
The additive Gaussian noise model is the most
commonly used noise model in power signal
processing. Many methods have been proposed to
increase its Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR), including
a fourth-order cumulant[6] , power (second-order
moment), and integration[2] . In Ref. [6], taking
advantage of the fact that the high-order statistics of
Gaussian noise is zero, the authors introduced a fourthorder cumulant to eliminate noise. They also compared
the performance of the three methods mentioned above
and concluded that the fourth-order cumulant achieved
the best result. However, this method has a limitation
in that it is only effective when the signal has high
kurtosis. If the power consumption signal is filtered,
the kurtosis of the power signal is rather small, and this
method is rendered ineffective.
In this paper, we focus on recovering the 3DES
keys in smart cards following SCA attacks, and
propose a key recovery solution that integrates
appropriate preprocessing methods with an improved
attack strategy. Using a power analysis system in our
laboratory, we mount successful attacks on the 3DES
in a real-life 32-bit CPU smart card. The experimental
results show that our key recovery solution is more
efficient than both the traditional Correlation Power
Analysis (CPA) and CPA using other high-order
preprocessing methods. In addition, we discuss our
improved attack strategy. Our work reveals that smart
cards equipped only with simple countermeasures
such as increasing the noise and filtering the power
consumption are vulnerable to black-box SCA.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows.
In Section 2, we introduce the measurement setup and
the target smart card. In Section 3, we describe in
detail the proposed key recovery solution. In Section 4,
we recover a 3DES key and compare the experimental
results of our solution with those of traditional CPA
as well as CPA using other high-order preprocessing
methods. We discuss the proposed strategy in Section
5, and make our conclusion in Section 6.

2
2.1

Measurement Setup and Object of Attack
Power analysis system

We designed and implemented a power analysis system
in our lab. As shown in Fig. 1, we used a PC as
the control center, a programmable card reader as the
device environment, and a commercial mixed-signal

Fig. 1
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Architecture of the power analysis system.

oscilloscope (Agilent Infiniium 54 830) to measure the
power consumption of the target smart card.
The programmable card reader, developed on an
FPGA board, can be configured as a reader, a card,
or an eavesdropper between the card and reader. In
our case, we used it as an ISO7816 compliant card
reader. The reader communicates with the PC and
passes commands and data (e.g., plaintexts) to the
target card. It also generates a trigger signal for the
oscilloscope to begin a measurement. To acquire power
consumption information, we put a small resistor in the
Vcc path. With a differential probe and a sampling rate
of 2108 s 1 , the oscilloscope measures the voltage
difference of the resistance, which indicates the power
consumption of the smart card. The acquired power
traces were then sent to the PC to be analyzed.
2.2

Object of attack

The target card is a dual-interface smart card, which can
be used as a bank card, an access card, or a student
ID card. It integrates a 32-bit CPU and a hardwareimplemented 3DES engine. Figure 2 shows a block
diagram of the smart card. Information provided by
the card manufacturer indicates that the target smart
card is equipped with countermeasures against SCA,
such as increasing the noise and filtering the power
consumption signal.

3

Key Recovery Solution

We propose a key recovery solution that integrates
preprocessing methods with an improved attack
strategy and which can reveal the 3DES keys of a smart
card in a black-box scenario in which the standard
countermeasures have been used, as described above.
The key recovery solution can be summarized in Fig. 3.
3.1

Preprocessing of raw power traces

Rationale for preprocessing

A misalignment of
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Fig. 2

Block diagram of the target smart card.

Fig. 3

Key recovery solution.

Fig. 4

power traces and noise reduces the SNR, and thereby
increases the difficulty of making an attack. In this
section, we focus on the preprocessing methods used.
Preprocessing: alignment An unstable clock,
a random delay, or inaccurate triggering in
measurement[2] usually causes misalignment of
the power traces. Many alignment methods have
been proposed, including pattern matching[2] , sliding
window DPA[7] , wavelet transformation[8] , elastic
alignment[9] , and Differential Frequency Analysis
(DFA)[10] .
Of these methods, pattern matching is an effective
option because of its low computational complexity. In
our case, the most critical issue in pattern matching is to
find a suitable pattern, namely, a template for aligning
the power traces, which should have distinctive features
and be as close as possible to the 3DES encryption.
As shown in Fig. 4, we locate the bus transfers
of plaintext and ciphertext by calculating correlation
coefficients of the plaintext/ciphertext bytes’ Hamming
Weights and power traces from 4000 power traces. The
results also indicate that there is an unprotected 8-bit
data bus in the smart card.
A zoomed-in view of the intervals of the 3DES
encryption is shown in Fig. 5, and we can see that

Correlation coefficients of plaintext and ciphertext.

Fig. 5

Power trace of 3DES encryption.
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there are six equidistant peaks after the encryption. We
used these peaks as our template to align the power
traces because they are close to the intervals of 3DES
encryption, and are very distinct from other peaks in
the trace.
Preprocessing: noise reduction
The authors in
Ref. [6] used a fourth-order cumulant to reduce the
noise, as shown in Eq. (1):
4 D EŒ.x E.x//4  3EŒ.x E.x//2 2 (1)
However, as shown in Fig. 5, the peaks in the power
trace are not as sharp as they should be because of
power filtering. Thus, the fourth-order cumulant is not
suitable for use in this case.
We introduce a fourth-order moment, Eq. (2), to
deal with this countermeasure. This method retains the
merits of high-order statistics in reducing the Gaussian
noise, and has no requirement regarding the kurtosis of
the signal to be processed. As shown in Fig. 6, in this
case, our method achieves a much better result than that
of the fourth-order cumulant.
M4 D EŒ.x E.x//4 
(2)
We also considered other high-order statistics,
including a third-order cumulant and a third-order
moment. While the third-order cumulant can also
reduce the Gaussian noise, it is not suitable for
a symmetrically distributed signal. The experimental
results presented in Section 4 show that a fourth-order
moment works best in our case.
We note that these methods also help to correct the
misalignment of the power traces, since they use a
sliding window.
3.2

Improved attack strategy

Correlation Power Analysis CPA[11] is one of the

Fig. 6 Raw trace (upper), fourth-order cumulant (middle),
and fourth-order moment (bottom).
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most widely used SCA attack methods. Based on
the premise that the side-channel information is data
dependent, CPA uses Pearson’s correlation coefficient
to determine the linear relationship between the
side-channel information and the intermediate value
corresponding to a guessed key. Based on our
measurement setup, we implemented a CPA attack as
follows.
We recorded the power traces while the target device
was repeatedly executing 3DES encryption. Our power
analysis system guarantees the transparency of the
communication between the card and reader, so that
known plaintext attacks are made available. For every
possible key, we can calculate hypothetical intermediate
values of all the plaintexts. Generally, the intermediate
value should depend on both the plaintext and the key,
and be sensitive to any change in them. In the 3DES
algorithm, the value of R0 (see Fig. 1 of Ref. [12]) is a
reasonable choice.
To calculate the correlation, the hypothetical
intermediate values are mapped to the hypothetical
power consumptions based on a given power model,
and are then compared to the actual power consumption.
In a black-box attack, the implementation details of the
target cryptographic algorithm are not usually available
to the attackers, so typically, trial-and-error is used to
choose between power models. In 3DES encryption,
the outputs of each round are stored in two registers (see
the DES algorithm in Ref. [12]), and the HammingDistance (HD) model is commonly used to simulate the
register power consumption[2] . As such, here we chose
HD as our power model.
Improved Attack Strategy To improve the results
of the CPA, we propose an attack strategy based on the
DES algorithm (cf. Ref. [12]) and its features.
In the DES algorithm, the value of R is always passed
to L in the next round. Considering the hardware
implementation, this means that the L register always
flips in the same way as the R register does in the
previous round. Thus, similar side-channel leakage
can appear in two adjacent rounds. For example, at
the beginning of the second round, the value of the
R register changes from R0 to R1 , and the Hamming
distance of the R register is R0 ˚ R1 . At the beginning
of the third round, the value of the L register changes
from L1 D R0 to L2 D R1 , and the Hamming distance
of L equals R0 ˚ R1 .
Sometimes, the power consumption of the L register
is not considered, perhaps because the R register and
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its subsequent logic circuit consume more power than
the L register and its subsequent logic circuit. This
is due to the greater complexity of the logic circuit
connected to the R register, for example, the “f”
function. However, if the power consumption of the L
register and its subsequent logic circuit is not neglected,
it can be used to enhance the result of the attack. Our
attack strategy improves the attack result by combining
the side-channel information of adjacent rounds, and
comparing the hypothetical power consumption with
the summed power consumption of two adjacent clock
cycles rather than that of just one cycle.
Applications to Feistel Structure Our improved
attack strategy can be applied to all standard Feistel
ciphers, such as Blowfish and Twofish. Let F be the
round function, and Ki be the sub-key for round i .
The operation of a Feistel cipher in each round i D
0; 1; : : : ; n computes L and R as follows:
(
Li C1 D Ri ;
(3)
Ri C1 D Li ˚ F .Ri ; Ki /
From Eq. (3), we can deduce that Ri ˚Ri 1 D Li C1˚
Li . So, the Hamming distance of the R register in round
i equals that of the L register in round i C 1. This
improved attack strategy is effective for Feistel ciphers,
and can be extended to generalized Feistel structures.

4

Experimental Results

In this section, we compare the experimental results of
our proposed strategy with those of traditional CPA[11]
and CPAs with different high-order preprocessing
methods. We conducted all attacks under the same
conditions—in the same experimental environments, on
the same smart card, and with the same number of
power traces. We used 80 000 aligned power traces
to mount these attacks. In our case, each raw trace
contained 10 000 sample points, and it took about 1
second to acquire a trace. Therefore, the total time of
the online stage was about 22 hours.
4.1

Traditional CPA

Since the plaintexts are known, we applied our first
attack on the S-Box output of the first round of the first
DES. Corresponding to eight S-Boxes, we divided the
32-bit intermediate variable R0 ˚ R1 into eight parts,
with each part being the output of an S-Box. We carried
out attacks on each part separately. Taking S-Box 8
as an example, we illustrate the workflow of the CPA
attack in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Workflow of CPA Attack on S-Box 8
Input:
Preprocessed power traces fT 1 ; : : : ; T n t g and
corresponding plaintexts fP 1 ; : : : ; P n t g.
Output: The guessed key for S-Box 8: K8 .
1: for (eachGuessedKey 2 GF.26 //
2:
for (0 < i 6 n t /
3:
x.i/ D HD.F8 .GuessedKey ˚ P i /; P i /
4:
end for
5:
for (0 < t 6 l/
˚
6:
y t D T t1 ; : : : ; T tn t
7:
CorrelationGuessedKey .t/ D .x; y t /
8:
end for
9: end for
10: K8 = SearchPeak (fCorrelationGuessedKey j
GuessedKey 2 GF.26 /g/
11: return K8

Notation
To ensure a clear understanding, the
notations used in Algorithm 1 are detailed as follows.
We used the letters T and P , respectively, for the
power trace and plaintext. The number of power traces
used in the CPA attack is denoted as n t , and the
corresponding plaintexts for S-Box 8 are written as
fP 1 ; : : : ; P n t g. Each power trace is composed of l
sample points. Hence, the i -th power trace is denoted
as T i D fT1i ; T2i ; : : : ; Tli g. Furthermore, we used K8
to denote the six key bits corresponding to S-Box 8,
and F8 to denote the round function corresponding to
S-Box 8.
In Steps 1–7 of Algorithm 1, we can get 64 correlation
coefficient traces corresponding to 64 possible values
of K8 . In Step 8, we search these correlation traces
to determine whether a peak that is higher than the
noise level exists[2] . If the CPA attack is successful, the
highest peak will indicate the correct guess of K8 .
We conducted a traditional CPA attack and obtained
64 correlation traces for each S-Box, as shown in Fig. 7.
The correlation coefficient peaks of the correct key bits
of five S-boxes (S-Boxes 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8) exceeded the
p
interval ˙4= n t [2] at the correct time (beginning of the
second round), where n t is the number of power traces
used in the attack. For S-Boxes 4 and 5, there were no
obvious peaks. For S-Box 1, a small peak appeared at a
wrong time (beginning of the third round).
4.2

CPA with preprocessing methods

We introduced several kinds of high-order
preprocessing methods in Section 3.1. Here we conduct
CPA attacks using different preprocessing methods,
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Fig. 7

Correlation coefficients (CPA with 80 000 aligned power traces).

including a third-order cumulant, a third-order moment,
a fourth-order cumulant, and a fourth-order moment.
We used the same number (80 000) of power traces
as in the CPA attack, and the results are presented in
Figs. 8a–8d. As shown in Figs. 8b–8d, the best result
is achieved after noise reduction with the fourth-order
moment. In Fig. 8d, peaks have become higher for
all the S-Boxes. Moreover, for S-Boxes 4 and 5, the
p
peaks of the correct key exceed the interval ˙4= n.
For S-Box 1, peaks arise in both the second and third
p
rounds, but only the latter exceeds ˙4= n.
With 80 000 traces, we recovered the key bits of
at most seven S-Boxes using the conventional CPA.
Using the fourth-order moment method to preprocess
the power traces can improve the attack results.
4.3
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Proposed solution

By integrating the preprocessing methods of the fourthorder moment (cf. Section 3.1) and the improved attack
strategy (cf. Section 3.2), we conducted an improved
attack on the target card. The workflow of our attack
is presented in Algorithm 2. The differences between
Algorithms 1 and 2 are in the preprocessing (Step 1) and
Combine (Step 2) steps. The Combine step is detailed
in Algorithm 3. Let d be the number of sample points in
one round. We shift a preprocessed power trace T 0i by
d points, and add the shifted one to the original. Hence,
the information of two adjacent rounds is combined,
yielding a combined power trace TCi .
Using the same number of power traces as in the
traditional CPA attack, we achieved much better results,
as shown in Fig. 9. Compared with Fig. 8d, the peaks
of the right key bits of S-Boxes 1, 4, and 5 are higher
p
and exceed ˙4= n, as expected.
We applied our solution on the second round of the

Algorithm 2 Workflow of Improved Attack on S-Box 8
Input:
Preprocessed power traces fT 1 ; : : : ; T n t g and
corresponding plaintext fP 1 ; : : : ; P n t g.
Output: The guessed key for S-Box 8: K8 .
1: fT 01 ; : : : ; T 0n t g=FourthOrderMoment (fT 1 ; : : : ; T n t g/
2: fTC1 ; : : : ; TCn t g= Combine (fT 01 ; : : : ; T 0n t g/
3: for (eachGuessedKey 2 GF.26 //
4: for (0 < i 6 n t /
5:
x.i/ D HD.F8 .GuessedKey ˚ P i /; P i /
6:
end for
7:
for (0 < t 6 l d /
8:
y t D fTC1t ; : : : ; TCnt t g
9:
CorrelationGuessedKey .t/ D .x; y t /
10:
end for
11: end for
12: K8 = SearchPeak (fCorrelationGuessedKey j
GuessedKey 2 GF.26 /g/
13: return K8
Algorithm 3 Combine ()
Input: Preprocessed power tracesfT 1 ; : : : ; T n t g
Output: Combined power tracesfTC1 ; : : : ; TCn t g
1: for (0 < i 6 n t /
2: for (0 < t 6 l d /
i
3:
TCit D T ti C T tCd
4: end for
5: end for
6: return fTC1 ; : : : ; TCn t g

first DES in the same way, and then on the second DES.
The results are shown in Figs. 10–12.

5

Discussion
Strategy

of

the

Improved

Attack

The effects of the attack strategy on different S-Boxes
were not the same. The peaks of S-Boxes 1, 4, and
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Fig. 8a

Correlation coefficients (CPA with third-order cumulant).

Fig. 8b

Correlation coefficients (CPA with third-order moment).

Fig. 8c

Correlation coefficients (CPA with fourth-order cumulant).

Fig.
Fig.88d

Correlation coefficients (CPA with fourth-order moment).
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Fig. 9

Correlation coefficients for CPA against the 1st round of the 1st DES with 80 000 combined power traces.

Fig. 10

Correlation coefficients for CPA against the 2nd round of the 1st DES with 80 000 combined power traces.

Fig. 11

Correlation coefficients for CPA against the 1st round of the 2nd DES with 80 000 combined power traces.

Fig. 12

Correlation coefficient for CPA against the 2nd round of the 2nd DES with 80 000 combined power traces.

5 rise, while those of S-Boxes 3, 6, and 8 fall. Thus, the
strategy conditions must be discussed.
The power consumption of the i-th round Ci can be
written as in Eq. (4):

217

Ci D CRi C CLi C CNi D CRi C ˛CRi 1 C CNi (4)
where CR is the power consumption of the R register,
CL is the power consumed by the L register, and CN is
the noise. Since the L register always flips in the same

Tsinghua Science and Technology, April 2016, 21(2): 210-220
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way as did R in the previous round, CLi is proportional
to CRi 1 with a scale factor ˛.
CR can be divided into two parts: the power
consumption of the four target bits CRtar , and that of
the other bits CRother :
CR D CRtar C CRother
(5)
If we let H be the hypothetical power consumption,
the correlation coefficient .Ci ; H / can be written as
cov.Ci ; H /
.Ci ; H / D p
D
var.Ci /  var.H /
other
covŒ.CRtar
C ˛CRi 1 C CNi /; H 
i C CRi
D
p
var.Ci /  var.H /
cov.CRtar
i ;H/
(6)
p
var.Ci /  var.H /
In Eq. (6), H is only relative to CRtar
i , so
covŒ.CRother
C
˛CR
C
CN
/;
H
D0.
i
1
i
i
Combining two adjacent rounds, we have:
other
Cicomb D .1 C ˛/CRtar
C
i C .1 C ˛/CRi

˛CRi

1

C CRi C1 C CNi C1 C CNi

(7)

.Cicomb ; H / D .Ci ; H /
r
2
var.CRother /
i 1 /Cvar.CNi /
1 C var.CRi tar / C ˛ var.CR
var.CRtar
i
i /
r
var.CRother /
˛ 2 var.CRi 1 /Cvar.CRiC1 /C2var.CNi /
1C var.CRi tar / C
.1C˛/2 var.CRtar /
i

i

(8)
By combining these rounds, we increase the SNR,
and Eq. (8) clarifies the effect of this combination on
the noise: After the combination, the effect of CRother
i
remains the same, and the effects of CNi and ˛CRi 1
(power consumption of the L register) reduce by the
factor .1 C ˛/2 . However, this also brings new noise
terms as follows: CRi C1 (power consumption of the
R register in the next round) and CNi C1 (noise in the
next round). To compare .Ci ; H / and .Cicomb ; H /,
we made the following hypothesis to simplify Eq. (8):
Hypothesis: var.CRi 1 /Dvar.CRi C1 /.
With this hypothesis, Eq. (8) can be deduced as
follows:
.Cicomb ;H />.Ci ;H /)˛ 2 var.CRi 1 / C var.CNi / >
.1C˛ 2 /
2
var.CRi 1 / C
var.CNi / (9)
.1 C ˛/2
.1 C ˛/2
p
For ˛ > 2 1, the noise term on the right side of
Formula (9) will be greater than that on the left. Then,
this inequality can be further simplified:

.Cicomb ; HD/ > .Ci ; HD/ )
.1C˛ 2 /
˛ 2 var.CRi 1 / >
var.CRi 1 / )
.1 C ˛/2
˛ 4 C 2˛ 3 1 > 0
(10)
For ˛ > 0, the solution set is ˛ > 0:7167, meaning
when ˛ > 0:7167, combining two adjacent rounds will
enhance the CPA result. The results show that while the
information leaked by the L register is comparable to
that of the R register, the proposed combination strategy
is worth trying.
As shown in Figs. 8d and 9, for S-Boxes 1, 4, and 5,
the correlation coefficient peaks of the second and third
rounds are similar, which means they have a large ˛, so
the peaks of the correct key bits become higher after the
combination.

6

Conclusion

In this work, we presented a key recovery solution
that integrates preprocessing methods with an improved
attack strategy. We then conducted black-box attacks
on the 3DES in a real-life 32-bit CPU smart card. In
the attack, we recovered 112 3DES key bits with 80 000
power traces.
Our results show that if proper preprocessing
methods are applied, it is feasible for an attacker to
obtain useful information from cryptographic devices
that are equipped with no specialized countermeasures
in a “black-box” scenario. The unprotected data
bus leaks information about when the plaintext and
ciphertext are loaded. Hence, the encryption operation
can be quickly pinpointed. The power traces of
the smart card are not adequately uniform, and
as such, a proper “pattern” can be used to align
them. Designers should avoid such obvious patterns
in encryption/decryption operations. Adding noise and
filtering the power consumption are insufficient for
hiding security information, because various noise
reduction techniques can efficiently increase the SNR.
Based on features of the Feistel cipher, we proposed
an improved attack strategy that takes advantage of
the information leaked in two adjacent rounds. In the
3DES algorithm, L always changes in the same way
as R did in the previous round. Therefore, the power
consumption of the L register can be used to improve
the attack result. This strategy can increase the SNR
and enhance the power analysis result.
The proposed attack strategy does not rely on
hardware implementation, as it is based on the structure
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of a Feistel cipher. It can be used effectively when
the intermediate results, L and R, are kept in two
different registers and are operated separately and
simultaneously, which is natural and reasonable in the
hardware implementation of a Feistel cipher. Therefore,
the proposed method has good universality. To avoid
leakage of the L register and resist the improved attack
strategy, further countermeasures must be adopted.
Adding noise and filtering the power consumption
are not sufficient to resist SCA. In order to improve
the security level of secret information stored in smart
cards, designers must use multiple countermeasures to
defend these cards against SCA.
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